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Evolution of Maine’s Electric Utility Industry, 1975-1995 
 
Maine Policy Review (1995).  Volume 4, Number 2 
Recent articles in Maine Policy Review have focused on the sweeping changes taking place in 
Maine’s electric industry. We continue the dialogue with this article by Carroll Lee, Vice 
President-Operations at Bangor Hydro-Electric Company and Richard Hill, retired University 
of Maine Professor. Lee and Hill trace the electric industry evolution back 20 years and offer a 
comprehensive and integrated perspective on how this industry has progressed from a monopoly 
to one with significant elements of competition.  
Carroll R. Lee  
Richard C. Hill  
Introduction  
Since the introduction of electricity for commercial use a century ago, dramatic changes have 
occurred in the manner in which electricity has been provided and used. The initial supply 
systems of isolated hydro or coal-fueled generating systems, which powered lights, small 
manufacturing, and transportation systems, have evolved to modern, large capacity systems of 
high voltage transmission networks connecting large power stations essential for the 
maintenance of a modern, high-income producing economy. As electricity supply evolved, the 
planning and development of the systems was undertaken by electric utility organizations, under 
the supervision of governmental regulation. Such regulations helped to assure the supply of this 
service at a minimum cost to consumers and, by many observers' accounts, this structure was 
quite successful.  
Over the past two decades, changes in Maine and elsewhere have signaled a transition from an 
electrical monopoly towards an industry with significant competition. This evolution was driven 
by two related events:   
• Utilities and their regulators overestimated the growth in demand for electric power; and,  
• The bizarre behavior of the price of oil.  
As a result, public policy forced:   
• The abandonment of large generation projects like Seabrook;  
• The purchase of non-utility generator-supplied power; and,  
• Utilities to subsidize conservation.  
When the price of oil collapsed, dropping from $50/bbl in 1982 to $18/bbl in 1986, (reported in 
1989 dollars), competition to central-station electricity emerged. Utilities lost much of their 
residential heating load; former industrial customers invested in diesel generation; and electric 
utilities began scrambling to retain customers. These developments proved that new entrants in 
the industry could be accommodated, despite industry claims that this would adversely impact 
customers. In the context of increasing worldwide competition and a significant disparity in 
electricity prices in states and regions of the U.S., the public increasingly began demanding 
lower priced electricity. New laws and regulations continued to open up the traditional industry 
structure to competition.  
As competition has evolved, the approach to power supply planning and decision making has 
changed dramatically. In the pre-Seabrook era, power supply planning was accomplished by 
electric utilities and regulators under the assumption of little competition, with relative certainty 
of demand and cost recovery. Planning has increasingly recognized competitive threats, and 
long-term supply commitments are rarely undertaken by traditional electric utilities. The industry 
is rapidly disintegrating to separate businesses: A power supply business, subject to intense 
competition; a distribution business, continuing with a monopoly structure; and a retail sales 
business, with evolving competition.  
During the past two decades (see Figure 1), a historical evolution has occurred in power supply 
planning in Maine, responding to the rapid changes which have occurred in energy markets, and, 
during this same time period, an energy policy evolution has occurred as well, although perhaps 
at a slower pace, as predictions about high oil prices failed to materialize. 
Seabrook era planning  
By 1975 the world had already experienced the first Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) oil embargo and the price of oil increased from about $2 per barrel in the 
early 1970s to more than $10 per barrel (see Figure 2, only available in hardcopy). This event 
began a public policy debate in the U.S. and elsewhere concerning the future adequacy of oil and 
gas supplies and stimulated a significant interest in the development of alternative sources of 
energy and in energy conservation. Among the policy decisions were: 1) efforts to develop coal 
resources, including the undertaking of a multi-billion dollar federal Synthetics Fuels Program to 
demonstrate the viability of converting coal and other low-grade fossil fuels to usable liquid and 
gas fuel; 2) efforts to dramatically expand the use of nuclear power, including the development 
of fast breeder reactor technology to extend the fuel cycle, and research on the development of 
nuclear fusion; 3) efforts to promote the development and use of renewable resources like solar, 
hydro, wind, and biomass; and 4) the promotion of energy conservation.  
In New England and Maine, these problems manifested themselves in rapidly increasing oil and 
gas prices and, correspondingly, in electricity rates. Since New England and Maine depended to 
a large extent on oil for energy, the region’s economy was dramatically impacted. Electric 
utilities responded with a renewed commitment to nuclear power plant expansions, including 
plans for new generating plants in Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, 
and Maine. With historical success at plants like Maine Yankee, which produced extremely low-
cost electricity, optimism existed that these new plants would significantly reduce the region’s 
dependence on foreign oil and reduce electricity prices. Maine utilities considered and/or 
committed to substantial amounts of new capacity from these nuclear plants, including the 
planning of a 1,150 megawatt plant on Sears Island. However, the discovery of a potential 
earthquake fault line in the vicinity of that plant’s location resulted in its cancellation, to be 
replaced by a smaller, coal-fueled power plant. Smaller commitments were made by Maine’s 
electric utilities to several nuclear plants outside the state, with the expectation that the Sears 
Island coal plant would meet the rest of the need.  
Figure 1. Timeline of major power supply events  
1970  Public Service of New Hampshire (PSNH) commits to Seabrook nuclear station; oil 
is priced at $2/bbl ($8 in 1995 dollars); major power purchases from Canada 
negotiated. 
1973 Oil embargo; oil priced at $30/bbl (in 1995 dollars). 
1977 Central Maine Power Company (CMP) files for 600 megawatt coal station on Sears 
Island. 
1978 Wyman #4 oil plant comes on-line. 
1979 Iran Hostage Crisis: Oil is priced at $50/bbl (in 1995 dollars); Maine Public Utilities 
Commission (MPUC) turns down Sears Island proposal, and suggests conservation, 
cogeneration, and additional investment in Seabrook and other New England nuclear 
plants; Maine legislature enacts Small Power Production Facilities Act (SPPFA), 
incorporating the principles of the U.S. Congress of the Public Utilities Regulatory 
Policy Act (PURPA). 
1981 Maine establishes Qualifying Facilities (QF) rule.  
1982  MPUC affirms “avoided costs” as basis of purchase from QFs; Seabrook I and II to 
be used as benchmark. 
1984  Hearing examiner from MPUC recommends termination of Maine utilities' 
participation in Seabrook--becomes MPUC order in 1985. 
1985- 
1990 
Several hundred megawatts of QF-supplied electricy comes on-line to produce 30-40 
percent of Maine utilities' total need; oil dependency drops from 50% to 10%.  
1987 Demand side management (DSM) mandated.   
1988 Legislature mandates Least-Cost Energy Planning with preference to conservation 
and DSM. 
1989 MPUC rejects the proposed CMP/Hydro-Quebec power purchase. 
1990 Open market contracts start to replace avoided cost as basis of power purchases. 
1990 MPUC denies Bangor Hydro-Electric Company's (BHE's) request for approval of 
Basin Mills project.  
1992  Congress, via the Energy Policy Act, authorizes the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) to manage wholesale wheeling of power; the Holding 
Company Act of 1935 is amended to exempt wholesale generators from certain 
regulations. 
1993- 
1995 CMP and BHE buy out and terminate several QF contracts. 
1995 MPUC approves flexible pricing for electric utilities to facilitate response to 
competition; Legislature (L.D. 1063) requests MPUC to investigate orderly 
transition to more competitive market for electricity. 
Investment by Maine utilities in a coal-fueled power plant to be constructed in the state required 
pre-approval by the Maine Public Utilities Commission (MPUC) through the receipt of a 
Certificate of Necessity and Convenience. Central Maine Power Company, as the lead owner of 
Sears Island, requested approval of the plant in 1977 and this proceeding epitomized the 
approach to power planning during this era. This included: 1) the development of a forecast of 
demands; 2) the analysis of alternatives available to the utility; and 3) the demonstration that the 
alternative presented was the best alternative available. The MPUC then had to decide whether 
the proposed plant was “needed” prior to granting the requested certificate.  
The forecast of demand was based upon evolving econometric forecasting methodology. A 
mathematical model was developed that related historical economic and demographic data to 
electricity usage. Projections of these drivers into the future led to forecast of loads from the 
model. Although the price of electricity may have been one of the drivers of the forecast, this 
relationship was based solely upon historical data and presumed the status quo in terms of the 
monopoly structure of the industry.  
Prior to the request for approval of the Sears Island coal plant, several utility proposals for power 
supply had been approved by the MPUC. Approval for participation in the W.F. Wyman #4 plant 
(a 600 megawatt oil-fired unit located in Yarmouth, Maine) by Central Maine Power Company 
(CMP), Bangor Hydro-Electric Company (BHE) and Maine Public Service Company (MPS) had 
been received and the unit began operating in 1978. The Maine Yankee plant, which began 
operating in 1972, and the Maine Electric Power Company (owned jointly by CMP, BHE and 
MPS) transmission line and New Brunswick power purchases in the 1970-1975 time period had 
received full regulatory support. Utility proposals and regulatory approvals for power supply 
were quite routinely processed and approved. 
The Sears Island coal plant request began an era of change in the relationship between Maine’s 
electric utilities and the MPUC. If a date had to be chosen to identify the beginning of the 
transition between major eras in the electric utility industry in Maine, that date must be 
December 31, 1979. On that day the MPUC rejected CMP's proposal and suggested instead: 
Conservation, load management, cogeneration, purchases of Canadian hydro, and additional 
purchases of Seabrook and other New England nuclear stations. Maine’s electric utilities 
subsequently increased their investments in Millstone III and Seabrook I and II nuclear plants 
under construction and located in Connecticut and New Hampshire, respectively. Because these 
plants were located outside the state, Maine law did not require pre-approval of these 
investments.  
By the early 1980s, Maine utilities owned about 10% of the 2,300 megawatt (MW) Seabrook 
plant. CMP owned 6.55% (or 150 MW); BHE owned 2.22% (or 50 MW); and MPS owned 
1.46% (or 34 MW). Unfortu-nately, the construction of nuclear power plants generally, and 
Seabrook, in particular, experienced substantial problems related to the need to comply with 
rapidly increasing safety requirements (resulting from the Three Mile Island event) as well as 
historically high interest rates. Managers were unable to prevent these problems from delaying 
completion and increasing the cost dramatically. By 1984, the MPUC began an investigation to 
determine whether Maine utilities could and should seek to withdraw from the Seabrook project. 
During another long and contentious set of hearings, Maine’s utilities presented evidence that, 
despite the escalation in the cost of Seabrook, completion of the project was the least-cost option 
and continued involvement was appropriate. As in the Sears Island coal plant decision, the 
MPUC disagreed, finding that the best interest of Maine utilities and their customers would be 
served by a withdrawal from the project. Upon receipt of an offer to purchase from an affiliate of 
Eastern Utilites Associates, a Massachusetts utility, each of the Maine utilities sold their shares 
and disengaged from involvement in the project. The MPUC had become a significant 
participant in the power supply decisions of Maine utilities, and Maine entered an era when 
involvement in mega-power projects would become the rare exception, rather than the rule.  
Evolution of qualifying facilities and demand side management 
With the Seabrook withdrawal, power supply planning was increasingly influenced by MPUC 
regulation. New, non-utility suppliers would provide needed power and utilities would be 
required by the MPUC to undertake an active role in promoting the conservation of electricity. 
This era was instituted with passage of the U.S. Congress Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act 
(PURPA) and the National Energy Conservation Policy Act in the late 1970s in response to the 
second oil embargo and the “energy crises.” New entrants into the power supply industry in 
Maine were further encouraged by the Maine legislature and the MPUC. State legislation 
analogous to PURPA was en-acted in 1979 and the MPUC approved implementing regulations 
in May 1981. Qualifying facility suppliers (QFs) were relatively small plants that either 
generated and supplied steam in addition to electricity or were fueled with renewable resources. 
Utilities were expected to agree on the terms and price for purchases from QFs. “To counteract 
the monopoly power of the utility” and to “encourage the development of all economically viable 
projects,” the rule provided QFs with several rights, including: 1) the utility must purchase all 
electricity offered; 2) at a price based upon full avoided cost; 3) avoided cost data is public 
information, available to any QF; and 4) utilities may not unreasonably refuse to enter into long-
term contracts with QFs. 
In 1982, the MPUC reaffirmed the requirement that the price to be paid should be based upon the 
utilities’ avoided cost (as opposed to a price based upon the QFs’ cost or some discount from the 
utilities’ avoided cost). This avoided cost was the cost that would be avoided by the utility if it 
were to forego investments in its own generating facilities or purchases from utility suppliers. To 
determine this avoided cost, utilities were required to develop at least two power supply plans. 
The first plan was one in which the demand for electricity would all be provided from utility 
planned resources, and a second plan was one in which the demand was reduced by an 
established block of demand and still provided from utility planned resources. The difference in 
cost between these two plans represented the avoided cost of the utility for the specific block of 
power, stated in terms of dollars per unit of energy and/or capacity (cents per kilowatt hour or 
dollars per kilowatt year).  
The MPUC subsequently issued specific avoided cost determinations for Maine Public Service 
Company (MPS) and Central Maine Power Company (CMP). For MPS, in late 1982 the MPUC 
determined that the company’s avoided cost should be based upon the avoided cost of Seabrook, 
determined to be in the 9-10¢/kwh range. At this time, the MPUC determined that Seabrook was 
saleable, and, although no sale was imminent, MPS was ordered to enter into contracts with 
Sherman Lumber Company and Alternative Energy Decisions, Inc. for approximately 23 
megawatts. Similarly, for CMP the MPUC determined that its avoided cost should be based upon 
the avoided cost of Seabrook, established a similar avoided cost price, and ordered CMP to enter 
into contracts with several QF suppliers.  
With these decisions, a period of significant activity to develop QF resources in Maine began. 
Many developers attempted to negotiate contracts with Maine elec-tric utilities. During this 
period, 1983-1986, oil prices were more than $30 per barrel and projected by most “experts” to 
reach $100 per barrel by the year 2000. Avoided cost estimates by utilities were at 6¢/kwh in the 
mid-1980s and projected to rise to 15¢/kwh or more by the year 2000. QF contracts reflected 
these estimates, and in some cases were reviewed and approved by the MPUC. Several hundred 
megawatts of QF-supplied electricity, amounting to 30-40% of utilities’ total needs, began 
operating in the mid- to late-1980s. Rates were based upon the planning assumptions and 
methodologies prevalent during those times. That, in conjunction with other events described 
below, led to the next era in power supply planning--competitive bidding for power supply.  
Along with the development of the QF industry in Maine came the rise in importance of 
conservation and load management, usually known as demand-side management (DSM). When 
federal and state laws promoting QFs were enacted, similar laws were implemented encouraging 
energy conservation. In Maine, two laws were enacted to accomplish this objective: the Electric 
Rate Reform Act, enacted in 1987, and the Maine Energy Policy Act (MEPA), enacted in 1988. 
The Electric Rate Reform Act required the MPUC to establish rates related more closely to the 
costs of providing electric service and encouraged the MPUC to promote state indigenous energy 
resources. (Later a provision was added that resulted in subsidies for low income residential 
programs.) The Maine Energy Policy Act required Maine and its electric utilities to pursue a 
least-cost energy plan. When alternatives were otherwise equivalent, the MPUC was directed to 
give preference first to conservation and demand-side management and then to QF purchases. 
These laws were instrumental in policies and decisions later adopted by the MPUC to require 
electric utilities to purchase additional QF power and demand-side management programs. 
CMP’s proposed purchase from Hydro-Quebec was rejected because CMP had not aggressively 
pursued such alternatives. Bangor Hydro-Electric Company's (BHE's) proposed Basin Mi l l s 
project was not granted a Certificate of Convenience and BHE was ultimately penalized by the 
MPUC for not pursuing DSM appropriately. To further promote DSM, the MPUC adopted a 
“Rule on Cost-Effectiveness of DSM Electricity Efficiency Investments by Electric Utilities” in 
May 1987. This rule required electric utilities to undertake DSM if the cost was expected to be 
less than the cost of power supply alternatives. This cost was determined as the total cost, 
including the customer and utility cost, of the DSM program. The rule required that DSM 
programs be undertaken even though such a program could have the effect of increasing electric 
rates (see Figure 3).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. DSM Cost-effectiveness rule 
Example: Hypothetical water heater insulation, supplied free of charge 
Annual KWH savings - 400 kwh 
-Cost of insulation - $50 
-Expected life - 10 years 
-Cost of capital - 10% 
-Annualized cost - $8/yr. 
Electric rate - 10¢/kwh  
Avoided power supply cost - 4¢/kwh 
Participating customer benefit 
- Saves 400 kwh/year @ 10¢/kwh  = $40/yr 
Utility's (or other customers’) cost 
- Lost revenue 400 kwh/year @ 10¢/kwh = $40/yr  
- Avoided cost savings @ 4¢/kwh = (16)  
- Cost of insulation  = 8     
$32/yr  
The participating customer saves $40 per year, but $32 per year is in the form of a subsidy 
from the utility (or other customers). 
                     
Although resisted by electric utilities, this rule ultimately mandated multi-million dollar annual 
expenditures by electric utilities. Programs provided subsidized conservation measures like water 
heater wraps and high-efficiency lights. CMP implemented a competitive bidding program, 
called “Power Partners” whereby energy service companies bid for and received contracts to 
provide DSM services and be paid up to avoided costs, in a similar fashion as QF power 
purchases.  
By the late 1980s, the first generation of QFs had begun operating in Maine and required DSM 
investments had been undertaken. Traditional utility power supply investments in large, central 
power plants like Seabrook had been replaced with purchases from small, renewable fueled 
(biomass, refuse, and hydro) power plants, cogeneration facilities, and a multitude of DSM 
programs. Maine reduced its dependence upon oil for electricity generation from over 50% to 
about 10%. However, since the supply cost of these alternative resources was based upon the 
projections of expensive alternatives, including $50-$100 per barrel oil prices, the cost of 
electricity in Maine increased dramatically, about 50% (see Figure 4, only available in 
hardcopy).  
The final era of the past two decades had begun, when customers loudly protested large rate 
increases, when power supply planning was based upon competitive bidding, and when 
restructuring of the electric utility industry in Maine came under consideration.  
Evolving competition in power supply  
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the economic environment in which power supply planning 
was conducted changed considerably. The world-wide economy was rapidly opening to free-
market competition. The forecasts of high oil prices were replaced by the reality of low oil 
prices, falling to about $10 per barrel in 1993. Technology for producing electricity from fossil 
fuels, particularly gas and coal, continued advancing. Fuel to electricity efficiency improved 
from 30-40% to nearly 60% in modern, combined-cycle power plants. The era of utility 
investment in large nuclear or coal-fueled power plants had passed and was replaced by a power 
supply industry that included utility and non-utility investments in smaller power plants and a 
reduced demand for electricity. It had become apparent that the generation of electricity was no 
longer a monopoly. Competition in power supply was the preferred economic structure under 
which to operate.  
To facilitate this transition to competition in electricity power supply, the Energy Policy Act of 
1992 was enacted by the U.S. Congress. This act created a new class of non-utility generators, 
called exempt whole-sale generators and provided the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
new authority to order electric utilities to provide wholesale transmission access. This legislation, 
together with policies adopted by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, completed the 
transition from a monopoly to a competitive industry for wholesale power supply. Electric 
utilities and non-utilities could both invest in power supply facilities; wholesale purchasers could 
obtain access to competing suppliers of power. Not only could QFs participate in power supply, 
but new entrants such as independent power producers and power marketers could rapidly enter 
the business.  
In Maine, these laws and regulations resulted in bid solicitations for power supply by wholesale 
customers of Maine’s electric utilities. Maine’s major electric utilities had traditionally provided 
the full requirement of a number of municipal and cooperatively-owned electric utilities. This 
power was provided under federal regulation on a “cost of service” basis of rate-making, in a 
similar manner to retail rate determination. However, with the significant increase in electric 
rates in Maine, a significant incentive was created for these customers to seek alternative 
suppliers.  
When Madison Electric Works, a large municipal customer of CMP, selected Northeast Utilities, 
an electric utility principally serving Connecticut, as its power supplier, it became abundantly 
clear that the landscape of power supply planning in Maine had entered a new era. This bypass 
by Madison and other wholesale customers placed more upward pressure on electric rates of 
other customers of Maine’s electric utilities.  
Because of evolving worldwide competition and the political clout of electric customers, the 
traditional response by electric utilities--to file for an increase in rates--had become increasingly 
counterproductive. Not only was the prospect of receiving regulatory approval of such increases 
less likely, but increasing rates also exacerbated the problem as rate increases drove customers to 
other options for energy or conservation. As electric rates increased, not only did wholesale 
bypass become a possibility, but other supply alternatives evolved. For some customers, self-
generation became economically viable, using small diesel generators. For customers with steam 
requirements, cogeneration of electricity from steam generating plants became attractive. Many 
customers began switching from electricity for heating water or space to oil, propane, kerosene, 
and wood. Wholesale transmission access encouraged the formation of new wholesale 
customers. At least one new wholesale customer--Jay, Maine--is in the process of establishing 
such an entity now.  
New laws and regulations are likely to be enacted that allow competition for retail electricity 
sales. Several states, including California, have implemented or are considering implementing 
some form of retail electricity competition.  
Power supply planning - 1995  
In the context of increasing competition in electric power supply and the relatively poor 
competitive position of Maine’s electric utilities (due in large part to the high cost structure that 
has resulted from the first generation of QF purchases and DSM investments), power supply 
planning in Maine has changed in dramatic ways. The traditional role of the major electric 
utilities to undertake significant investments in generating plants no longer exists. Instead, the 
planning and provision of power in Maine has been implicitly, if not explicitly, assumed by the 
customers who need the power. Many potential suppliers of energy, including the traditional 
electric utilities, compete to serve this need, and public policies continue to evolve to complete 
the transition to full retail competition.  
In 1995, the New England region has substantial surplus power supply. Approximately 3,000 
megawatts of such excess capacity exists in New England and more is available from Canadian 
suppliers. Some of this capacity is owned by non-utility suppliers and more is under 
development. Power marketers have begun participating in the purchase and sale of power, 
making wholesale transactions more competitive.  
All electric utilities routinely conduct requests for proposals for power supply for periods from a 
few months to over five years and they routinely receive bids representing several times the 
required amount of power at prices in the 3¢/kwh range.  
Maine’s electric utilities have responded to these competitive changes in several ways. First, 
significant efforts have been undertaken by electric utilities to reduce their cost structure, 
including the buyout of high-cost QF contracts. In many cases, the cost of just operating these 
QFs has exceeded the total cost of replacement power supply, which allows the utility to buy out 
the owners of such facilities and still achieve net savings. These new pressures also caused 
electric utilities to reduce employment by hundreds of employees and implement substantial 
changes to business processes.  
Second, electric utilities have developed strategies to retain customers and increase the sale of 
electricity. Opportunities for increased electrification are evidenced by the experience of other 
regions. For example, in neighboring New Brunswick, electricity demand increases have 
outstripped growth in Maine by many fold (see Figure 5, only available in hardcopy) while 
electricity prices remained at 50% less than those in Maine. This indicates similar opportunities 
are possible in Maine. The increased sale of electricity is being pursued through flexible pricing 
policies, whereby the utility can offer to a customer or to groups of customers a competitive 
price that may differ substantially from the traditional, cost-of-service based tariff. The MPUC 
recently approved CMP's Alternative Rate Plan and BHE’s Alternative Marketing Plan. Both 
plans include pricing flexibility guidelines to allow faster implementation of competitive pricing 
and limit price increases allowed for captive customers. BHE also recently received approval to 
market residential heating service at a rate of 5¢/kwh. To increase revenues and diversify the 
revenue base, the electric utilities have initiated a range of strategies, including an increased 
emphasis on economic development and key account marketing and the development and 
implementation of new products and services. CMP has developed an international energy 
consulting business, and Maine’s three major electric utilities are considering investments in 
fiber optic networks for cable TV and long-distance telecommunications services.  
Finally, the industry is considering the prospect of regulatory restructuring. The Maine 
legislature has required the MPUC to conduct a study “to provide for an orderly transition to a 
more economically-efficient and competitive market for electricity.” This study, together with 
recommendations for implementation, is to be presented to the legislature by January 1, 1997. 
Regardless of the results of this study, increased competition is likely to change further in the 
electric utility industry. The generation and supply of power is likely to evolve as a separate and 
distinct line of business, one with substantial competition. Maine’s electric utilities may 
increasingly reduce their investment in this business. The distribution of electricity is likely to 
continue to exist as a monopoly, possibly as a separate line of business, but under a new form of 
economic regulation. Regulation is likely to move away from cost-plus to performance-based 
(e.g., cost efficient, quality) regulation. The retail sale of electricity is moving rapidly to 
increased competition, with the concerns of recovery of stranded investment costs and 
maintaining reliability of service still paramount, and potentially a third line of business in this 
new era.  
Conclusion  
During the past two decades, dramatic changes have occurred in Maine’s electric utility industry, 
planning for power supply, and regulation of electric utilities. The predictions of the 1970s and 
early 1980s of energy sup-ply shortages and high oil prices have not proven accurate. But energy 
policies were implemented based upon those predictions. Maine’s electric utilities and their 
customers are burdened with very high power supply costs due to high-cost QF contracts and 
diminished electricity demand caused by high electric prices, electricity conservation, and fuel 
switching. The major electric utilities in Maine find themselves positioned poorly as greater 
competition looms. With evolving competition, power supply planning will be conducted 
differently in the context of a restructured electric utility industry. Rather than the electric utility, 
in conjunction with regulators, determining the need for power and the type of supply to be 
provided, it will increasingly be the customer who decides how much electricity to purchase, 
over what term, at what price, and from whom. Potential suppliers will include wholesale power 
producers, power marketers, electric utility retail service companies, and possibly other entities 
who will all compete for business.  
With the role of traditional electric utilities (and their regulators) being reduced in providing for 
an electricity supply, the implications for electric policies in Maine are many. One of the most 
significant of these is who will be responsible for the “obligation to serve” role traditionally 
filled by electric utilities. The needs of society for a reliable electricity supply mandates early 
attention to this important detail. Policies must be established concerning who should pay for the 
costs associated with fulfilling this obligation, both for costs incurred by electric utilities in the 
past, so-called “stranded costs,” and for costs which will need to be incurred in the future to 
satisfy this mandate. Maine policy makers also need to revisit whether or not social policies, like 
utility subsidized conservation and low income programs, should continue to be mandates. 
Cross-subsidies in existing rates, which exacerbate the risks of uneconomic bypass, need to be 
unwound. Questions concerning the need for utility divestiture of generation assets, access to and 
cost of transmission services for wheeling purposes, and redefinition of remaining monopoly 
services need to be answered. Finally, policies should be implemented to level the playing field 
among all energy suppliers.  
Although difficult energy policy decisions remain, clear opportunities for future benefits to 
Maine consumers are in sight. By achieving competition in energy markets, substantially lower 
energy prices, particularly for electricity, should be achieved. Maine can also increase the 
security of its energy supply since it is a key geographical link between major energy producers 
in Canada, including electricity and natural gas supplies in Quebec and the Maritimes, and 
energy markets to the south. Increased electrification, as has occurred in New Brunswick, could 
also provide future enhancements to Maine’s economy and environment. As we choose which 
course to take in seeking these or other opportunities, we should reflect carefully upon the 
experience of the past two decades, a period of unpredictability in Maine energy planning when 
energy policies dramatically changed Maine’s electric utility industry.  
Caroll R. Lee is Vice President-Operations at Bangor Hydro-Electric Company. He has 
responsibility for customer services, marketing, engineer-ing and construction, and power 
supply. He has been employed by Bangor Hydro-Electric Company since 1972.  
Richard Hill is a retired Professor in Mechanical Engineering and Director Emeritus of the 
Department of Industrial Cooperation at the University of Maine. He is widely known for his 
work on energy and conservation projects.  
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